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CASE NOTES

been impaired by the husband's assault. Similarly, Minnesota, in the principal case, permits the wife's remedy to proceed because the marriage'
has been extinguished' by the death of her tortfeasor husband. Where
the marriage has been otherwise terminated, as by divorce, Minnesota,
with the majority has not previously granted an action for a tort committed during coverture.37 The present decision would seem to favor'
such suits.
The common law spectre prohibiting interspousal personal suits still
looms large. For most states the gap between a cause of action and no
cause of action is too wide to breach. The principal case38 suggests a
palatable compromise whereby the fiction of "family harmony" may
be laid to rest, intermediately, if not finally.
Jerome Levitt
37 Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906).
38 Accord, Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 :(1961); Johnson v. Peoples First

Natl. Bank & Tr. Co., supra note 33.

PATENTS-CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT-HISTORY AND
TREND: CONVERTIBLE, TOP CASES
In October, 1951, the United States Patent Office issued a patent on
on automobile convertible top structure. All rights to the patent were
assigned by the patentee to the Auto Body Research Corporation which
later assigned all its rights under the patent in, the state of Massachusetts
to the Convertible Top Replacement Company. During the model years
1952 through 1954 automobiles employing the patented structure were
manufactured by both the General Motors Corporation and the Ford
Motor Company. General Motors was licensed under the patent by
Auto Body Research Corporation; however, the Ford Motor, Company
had no license whatsoever. The Convertible Top Replacement Company, hereinafter called Convertible, brought a suit against the Aro
Manufacturing Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as ARO, based
upon ARO's unauthorized manufacture and installation; in the state of
Massachusetts, of replacement fabric components designed specifically
for installation in the 1952 through 1954 model General Motors and
Ford convertibles. In a previous decision, the United States Supreme
Court decided that ARO was not liable for patent infringement due to
its manufacture and installation of replacement fabric components for
the General Motors convertibles.' In the present case the court decided
1Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 128 U.S.P.Q. 354

(1961).
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that ARO was liable as a contributory infringer of the patent due to its
manufacture and sale of replacement fabric components for the Ford

convertible. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 141 U.S.P.Q. 681 (1964).
The principal privilege conferred by granting a patent is the right to
exclude others from making, using, and selling his invention during the life
of the patent. 2 In enforcing this right, a patentee is allowed to bring a
tort action against anyone who, without the inventor's permission, makes,
uses or sells a device embodying a mechanism described by the claims of
3
the inventor's patent or who performs any combination of these acts.
Additionally, the inventor has traditionally been allowed to bring a tort
action against anyone who, while not actually infringing the patent himself, aids and abets an infringement by making a mechanism which comprises a substantial part of the invention as described by the claims of
the inventor's patent and which is not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use. A person who so aids and abets in patent infringement
4
has traditionally been known as a contributory infringer.
In bringing its action against ARO for contributory infringement,
Convertible relied on the section of the 1952 Patent Act which defines
contributory infringement. 5 ARO, in its defense, relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in the prior ARO case and on Supreme Court decisions
handed down prior to the 1952 Patent Act.6 By deciding the case in
favor of Convertible, the Supreme Court reinstated the doctrine of contributory infringement and thereby held that Congress had succeeded
in its attempt to codify the law of contributory infringement.
The first reported case in which relief for contributory infringement
was granted was the case of Wallace v. Holmes.7 In that case, the claims
of the patent sued on recited (1) an oil burning lamp (and in so doing
called for a lamp base), (2) the means for attaching a chimney to the
base, and (3) a chimney. The invention, however, was the means for
attaching the chimney to the base. The defendant manufactured lamp
bases embodying the new chimney attaching mechanism but did not
manufacture chimneys nor sell chimneys in combination with the base.
Hence, the defendant did not make, use or sell a mechanism defined by
the claims of the patent. Since chimneys which would fit the lamp base
were available in hardware stores throughout the country, it would be
235 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
335 U.S.C. § 281 (1952).

435 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).

5Brief for Respondent, Summary of Argument, p. 3.
6Brief for Petitioners, Statement, p. 6.
7 29 Fed. Cas. 75 (No. 17100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
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a simple matter for a consumer to buy the defendant's lamp base, independently buy a chimney and later as,.emble the two parts thereby
creating a mechanism which infringed the patent. There could never be
any infringement of the patent until the lamp was actually put to use
by the consumer, thus, in order to obtain, relief for patent infringement
the inventor was faced with the insurmountable problem of suing each
consumer who had purchased one of the defendant's lamp bases and
had subsequently put it to its normal rLse. The inventor did not, of
course, take this course of action, but instead sued the defendant alleging
that said defendant was actually a joint tortfeasor with each and every
person who had infringed the inventor's patent, since the defendant had
done all the acts necessary for an infringement of the patent with the
exception of finally assembling the lamp base and the chimney. The
court agreed with this theory and found the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for patent infringement, thereby initiating the tort of contributory infringement. 8
The high point of the doctrine of contributory infringement was
reached in the case of Heaton-Peninsularv. Eureka,9 wherein the court
held that when a patented stapling machine was sold on the condition
that it be used only with the seller's staples, a use of someone else's staples
in the device was patent infringement, and that the making and selling
of staples which fit the patented machine was contributory infringement.
The doctrine was later seriously limited in the case of Motion Pictures
Patents Company v. Universal Film,10 wherein it was held that a patent
upon a motion picture projector could not be used to obtain a monopoly
upon unpatented motion picture film. This case established the doctrine
of patent misuse which provides that a patentee attempting to use his
patent to obtain a monopoly upon an unpatented article of commerce
is guilty of patent misuse and is therefore barred from obtaining relief
for patent infringement.
The doctrine of patent misuse had a sexrious effect upon the concept
of contributory infringement in the case of Mercoid Corporationv. MidContinent Investment Co." In that case, the Supreme Court broadened
the doctrine of patent misuse and stated by way of dicta that after the
8 Accord, Bowker v. Dows, 3 Fed. Cas. 1070 (No. 1734) (C.C.D. Mass. 1878). But
if the part supplied is susceptible to innocent use tLere is no liability for contributory
infringement. See Snyder v. Bunnel, 29 Fed. 47 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1886).
0 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896); accord, Henry v. A. B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912); but
see Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
10243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,

52 U.S.P.Q. 30 (1942); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 8 U.S.P.Q. 211 (1931).
11 320 U.S. 661, 60 U.S.P.Q. 21 (1944).
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decision there might not be anything left in the doctrine of contributory
infringement.12 After this decision, the number of cases in the federal
courts in which contributory infringeme nt Was an element of the decision was. substantially reduced.13 Those' courts which did decide the
issue were divided as to whether or not the Mercoid decision had elimi14
nated recovery for contributory infringement.
In 1952, Congress enacted the present patent statute and in so doing
provided the first legislation on the subject of contributory infringement.
During the time that the 1952 Act was being debated in the Congress,
it became clear that the legislators intended to restore the relief provided
by the concept of contributory infringement to patentees."5 Following the
congressional enactment, various decisions in federal courts indicated that
the congressional intent had been fulfilled.. 6 However, the first time that
the Supreme Court dealt with contributory infringement under the Act
was in the Aro Mfg. Co. case.
In the case as originally brought against ARO by Convertible, relief
was sought for contributory infringement arising out of the manufacture
and installation by ARO of replacement fabric components for both
the Ford arid the General Motors convertibles; however, it was soon
12 Ibid.
13 The following table (derived from' theAmerican Digest System) reveals the
numbers of cases, in which contributory infringement was at issue. The reader should
relate the Mercoid case (1944) and the codification of the patent laws (1952).
Years
No. of Cases
-1896 ......
................ .. 31
1896-1906....... _ ............... 21
1906-1916............... ...
21
1916-1926 ........
.......... 16
1926-1936..... .................... 37
1936-1946 ......................... 45
1946-1956 ........................ 8
1956-* ..................... 26
November, 1964.

14In an'editorial 'note in the George Washington Law Review, Carrol F. Palmer pointed out that, of the.,several cases shortly following the Mercoid decision,
four cases stated that the doctrine of contributory infringement had been eliminated
by the Mercoid decision (three by dicta), 'and 'eight cases stated otherwise (four by
dicta). 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 463 (1947). See also 39 ILL. L. REv. 55 (1944). See also
Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370,' 64' U.S.P.Q. 525 (1945), wherein the
Supreme Court held that 'sibcombination claims'should be granted to the applicant
because he would'be unable to protect the subcombination without such claims.
15 Material indicating the congressional intenit with' respect to the section' of the
enactment relating to contributory ififringentient is found at 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 2394 (82d Cong., 2d'Sess. 1952).
16 Southern States Equip. Corp. v. U.S.C.O. Power Eq'p. Corp., 209 F.2d 111, 100
U.S.P.Q. 127 (5th Cir. 1953); Sola Electric Co. v. General' Electric, 146 F. Supp. 625,
111 U.S.P.Q. 203 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
1 -

CASE NOTES

discovered that there was a substantial difference between the acts of
ARO as concerned witht General Motors convertibles as opposed to
their acts as they were connected with Ford convertibles.1 7 After district and appellate decisions, the Supreme Court decided in an opinion
now known as ARO I that ARO was not liable to Convertible for its
activities concerned with the General Motors cars due primarily to the
fact that General Motors had a license from the Auto Body Research
Company, and hence, the owners of the General Motors cars obtained
through General Motors a license to use the cars. Ford, however, had
no license allowing it to manufacture automobiles employing the patented
structure and hence the owners of the Ford cars had not obtained any
license to use the cars through Ford. Since the very use by the owners
of the Ford convertibles was patent infringement, the .activities of ARO
with respect to the Ford convertibles tended to prolong the infringement.
The decision in the ARO I case was worded in such a manner that
many writers believed the court was following the dicta in the Mercoid
case and that Congress had failed its attempt to reinstate the tort of contributory infringement.' 8 These writers were in good company since
in its defense in the second ARO case, ARO relied substantially on the
decision of the first ARO case' 9 and since four dissenting members of
the Supreme Court also felt that the first ARO decision had refused
relief for contributory infringement.2 0 The majority of the Supreme Court
in the second ARO decision found, however, that the first ARO decision
had been directed to ARO's activities with respect to the General Motors
cars only and hence had no bearing on the second ARO case. 21 The
majority went on to hold that Congress had succeeded in reinstating the
doctrine of contributory infringement and that ARO was liable to Convertible .for contributory infringement.
17 In the original suit by Convertible against AR.O, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts distinguished ARO's activitie.; with respect to G.M. convertibles
from its activities with respect to Ford convertibles but entered an interlocutory judgment for Convertible on both counts. 119 U.S.P.Q. 122 (1958). This judgment was
affirmed on appeal. 270 F.2d 200, 122 U.S.P.Q. 536 (1st. Cir. 1959). However, it was
reversed by the Supreme Court. 365 U.S. 336, 128 U.S.P.Q. 354 (1961), petition for
rehearing or alternative motion for amendment or clarification denied 365 U.S. 890,
(1961). On remand (the noted case), the judgment was dismissed as to both G.M.
and Ford convertibles. 377 U.S. at 480, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 683 (1964). On appeal, judgment with respect to the Ford convertibles was reihstated. 312 F.2d 52, 136 U.S.P.Q.
9, Cert. granted 372 U.S. 958, (1962).
18See Note, 31 U. CiNc. L. REv. 61 (1962); Note 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 343.
19 Supra note 6.
20
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 515, 141 U.S.P.Q.

681, 697 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Blck).
21 Id. at'479, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 683.
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The four members of the court who formed the minority were joined
by Justice White on one point of the case, thus becoming the majority as
to this matter. The point was whether the contributory infringement
section of the 1952 Patent Act required scienter on the part of alleged
contributory infringers before they could be liable to inventors for their
tort. That is, are the alleged contributory infringers required to have
knowledge of the fact that the device for which they supply a component
is both patented and infringed? The majority of the court found that
this knowledge is required and thus held that ARO was not liable to
Convertible until it was informed that the convertible tops for which
it manufactured replacement fabric components were both patented and
22
their product was infringing.
The majority's holding in regard to the reinstatement of the doctrine
of contributory infringement returns to inventors a valuable tool in the
struggle to protect their inventions, since it returns to them the right to
proceed against a manufacturer who supplies the tools of infringement
as opposed to the necessity of proceeding against multitudinous consumer-infringers. The requirement of knowledge of the existence of the
patent and of the infringing use on the part of the contributory infringer
will not limit this relief substantially, since in many cases it will not be
difficult to prove such knowledge. Thus, it appears that the decision returns to patentee a substantial right, the existence of which has been in
serious doubt ever since the Mercoid case.
Michael O'Neil
22

Id. at 488, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 687.

PATENTS-FACTUAL APPLICATION OF THE "OLD
COMBINATION" DOCTRINE
Holstensson and others brought action against the V-M Corporation
for infringement of Holstensson's patent. The claim, in defining the scope
of the monopoly granted to the inventor, covered the combination of a
new and improved spindle or post for holding phonograph records with
other components of the record changer. The defendant tried to raise
the defense that the plaintiff's patent was invalid for patenting more
than he had actually invented, which is referred to as the doctrine of
"old combination." At the trial, the defendant's expert demonstrated that
the only novel portion of the record player was the spindle. A demonstration showed that the plaintiff's novel spindle could be employed in
an old record changer, which had previously been patented by one
Arvidius, apparently without any changes being made in the other com-

